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interest in the regulation of its corporations and the uniform appli-
cation of its laws.60
The concurring justices expressed concern over the uncertainty
of the International Shoe standard." While the decision makes more
sense than the "patchwork of legal aid factual fictions generated
from Pennoyer v. Neff," 2 disputes over fairness and reasonableness
as articulated in International Shoe will prove time consuming and
difficult. Questions surrounding the vitality of the Seider line of
decisions are evidence of the problems posed. Nevertheless, inter-
ests in expediency, simplicity, and uniformity cannot outweigh the
constitutional mandate of due process of law.
MARIA MASINTER
The Eighth Amendment, Rape, and Sexual
Battery: A Study in Methods of Judicial Review
A recent United States Supreme Court decision established a new
eighth amendment test for the constitutionality of punishment
which may be out of proportion with the severity of a crime. After
examining the Court's statement and use of this test for the rape
of an adult the author concludes that the Court's test is not
entirely satisfactory. Finally, the author applies the new test of
constitutionality of capital punishment to the crime of sexual
battery as defined in the Florida Statutes.
I. THE DEVELOPING EIGHTH AMENDMENT STANDARD
While serving three consecutive life terms and two twenty-year
terms for rape and murder convictions, the defendant escaped from
a Georgia correctional facility. Several hours later the defendant
unlawfully entered the victim's home. Brandishing a board and a
knife the defendant forced the victim to bind her husband, raped
her and escaped in the family automobile holding the victim as his
hostage. The defendant was apprehended shortly thereafter, having
caused no further harm to the victim. A jury found the defendant
60. For a general discussion of Shaffer v. Heitner, see The Supreme Court, 1976 Term,
91 HAv. L. Rav. 152 (1977). See generally In Personam Jurisdiction - Due Process and
Florida's Short "Long Arm", 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 336 (1971).
61. 97 S. Ct. at 2587 (Powell, J. and Stevens J., concurring).
62. Id. at 2588 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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guilty, inter alia, of rape and armed robbery.' During a separate
sentencing proceeding, the jury determined that two statutory ag-
gravating factors for rape existed. Defendant was a prior capital
felony offender, and the rape was committed during the perpetra-
tion of another capital felony, armed robbery.2 The jury recom-
mended death. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the sen-
tence of death. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
held, reversed: Capital punishment is grossly disproportionate to
the crime of rape of an adult female as defined by the Georgia
statutes and is therefore forbidden by the eighth amendment as
cruel and unusual punishment.3 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977).
The standards of review used by members of the Court to re-
1. Defendant was convicted of rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, motor vehicle theft, and
escape. Coker v. State, 234 Ga. 555, 556, 216 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1975). The Georgia rape statute
under which defendant was convicted is as follows:
A person commits rape when he has carnal knowledge of a female, forcibly and
against her will. Carnal knowledge in rape occurs when there is any penetration
of the female sex organ by the male sex organ. A person convicted of rape shall
be punished by death or by imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for not less
than one nor more than 20 years. No conviction shall be had for rape on the
unsupported testimony of the female.
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1972). The armed robbery statute under which defendant was
convicted reads in pertinent part:
A person commits armed robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he takes the
property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use
of an offensive weapon. . . . A person convicted of armed robbery shall be pun-
ished by death or imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for not less than one
nor more than 20 years.
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1902 (1972). It is doubtful, however, that armed robbery remains a capital
crime. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976).
2. The statute containing descriptions of the aggravating circumstances for rape reads
in pertinent part:
(b) In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized,
the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it
to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise
authorized by law and any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances
which may be supported by the evidence:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was commit-
ted by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony. ...
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was commit-
ted while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony,
or aggravated battery. ...
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, deprav-
ity of mind, or aggravated battery to the victim.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Supp. V 1977).
3. Justices White, Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in the opinion of the Court
delivered by Justice White. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in separate opinions.
Justice Powell concurred in part and dissented in part. Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist dissented.
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duce the eighth amendment's moralistic term "cruel" 4 to a judi-
cially manageable formula have varied and may presently be in
flux. Justices Brennan and Marshall, while using different tests,
have maintained that capital punishment per se violates the eighth
amendment.5 Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist have
maintained that the judiciary should not impose its preference on
4. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
5. Justices Brennan and Marshall articulated their separate eighth amendment tests in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Justice Brennan concluded capital punishment per
se violates the eighth amendment after applying a purported cumulative test. That "test"
he stated as follows:
It is a denial of human dignity for the State arbitrarily to subject a person to an
unusually severe punishment that society has indicated it does not regard as
acceptable, and that cannot be shown to serve any penal purpose more effectively
than a significantly less drastic punishment.
408 U.S. at 286.
Justice Brennan used a cumulative test to reach the conclusion that capital punishment
is unconstitutional. A potential problem with this method arises because one of the impor-
tant factors in his purported test supported the constitutionality of capital punishment. That
factor was the degree to which society accepted capital punishment. Since history, precedent,
and legislation indicated that capital punishment has greater than majority appeal, it would
seem that Justice Brennan should add the weight of this factor to a holding of constitution-
ality. Instead Justice Brennan emphasized the role of a sizeable minority of states that have
rejected the death penalty. Rather than finding that the majority of states' approval was a
factor contributing to a holding of constitutionality, Justice Brennan regarded the minority's
disapproval of capital punishment as a factor indicating the unacceptability of capital pun-
ishment. Justice Brennan then added this factor to the index of the unconstitutionality of
capital punishment. Also included in that index were such considerations as the gross arbi-
trariness necessarily involved in capital sentencing, and the absence of convincing proof that
capital punishment serves penological purposes more effectively than life sentencing. Justice
Brennan then concluded that the aggregate of these factors precluded the use of capital
punishment.
If Justice Brennan's characterization of his method as a "cumulative" test is accurate,
the several factors in this test should be variables. Under such a test situations might exist
in which the use of capital punishment would comply with enough of the requirements that
the sentence would be constitutional. However, under Justice Brennan's per se rule the
factors cannot be variables: no situation will exist in which capital punishment will be
permissible. Thus, Justice Brennan has not formulated a test but described his conclusion
and legitimized his new per se rule in terms of static concepts. This opinion is, therefore, not
helpful in developing an analytical framework for eighth amendment cases.
Justice Marshall's test is composed of four independent lines of inquiry. If any of the
questions are resolved against capital punishment, the sanction is per se unconstitutional. If
the prisoner experiences pain and suffering the punishment is unconstitutional. The imposi-
tion of a new punishment grossly more severe than the one previously imposed is unconstitu-
tional. States are forbidden to impose capital punishment unless it has been proven more
effective than life sentencing. The justices, as predictors of the reactions of an informed
citizenry, must invalidate death sentencing if information within the justices' purview dem-
onstrates the inappropriateness of capital punishment. Justice Marshall held capital sentenc-
ing unconstitutional because the death penalty is disapproved of by society and does not serve
valid penological purposes more effectively than life imprisonment. 408 U.S. at 330-33, 342-
69. Thus, Justice Marshall did not establish a test to be applied by other courts but a per se
rule to be mechanically applied by courts agreeing with his conclusion.
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the states' substantive choice of capital punishment and have ap-
plied minimum scrutiny to capital sentencing legislation.' Other
members of the Court have vacillated between minimum scrutiny
in cases such as Gregg v. Georgia and stricter scrutiny as in Coker
v. Georgia.'.
The plurality in Gregg held capital punishment constitutional
when imposed upon one who has committed an aggravated murder.'
The Court used a deferential standard of review to arrive at its
conclusion.' The Court limited the eighth amendment's ban either
to punishment which involves "the unnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion of pain,"'" or to punishment which is grossly disproportionate
to the crime."
Since the Gregg Court adopted previous holdings that capital
punishment is not cruel in the sense of torture, it limited its in-
quiry to whether capital punishment is grossly disproportionate to
aggravated murder. The test of proportionality turned upon three
questions: (1) whether societal standards of decency have evolved
to the extent that the public no longer accepts the use of this sanc-
tion; (2) whether the use of capital punishment has a valid penal
purpose; and (3) whether the states' capital sentencing review pro-
cedures prevent the arbitrary use of the penalty, that is, would
capital punishment only be imposed for severe criminal acts.
The Gregg Court's proportionality test began by considering
objective indications of societal acceptance of the death penalty.
Legislative history, precedent, popular referendums, and jury be-
havior demonstrated societal acceptance of capital punishment
when imposed for aggravated murder.'" The plurality, therefore,
rejected the notion that societal standards of decency preclude im-
position of the death penalty.
The Gregg Court also inquired whether capital punishment
6. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2872-81 (1977) (Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 375-76, 465-80 (1972) (Burger, C.J., &
Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 1972 L. & Soc. ORD. 393, 395.
7. Compare Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ.) with Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1977) (White, Stewart, Blackmun, and
Stevens, JJ.).
8. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
9. See notes 14-17 infra and accompanying text.
10. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
392-93 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
11. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100
(1958) (plurality opinion) (dictum)).
12. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 178 (1976) (citing in re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447
(1890); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 99 (1958)).
13. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-82 (1976).
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serves penal purposes more effectively than imprisonment. The
challenger of the legislation bore the burden of persuasion:4 the
defendant was required to show capital punishment had no greater
deterrent effect than permanent incarceration." Because empirical
studies of capital punishment's deterrent effect were contradictory,
the Court concluded that it was unclear whether capital punish-
ment more effectively serves that penological purpose." Since the
defendant could not demonstrate capital punishment was any more
or less effective than life sentencing, its use was legitimate. Thus the
Court concluded:
[W]e cannot say that the judgment of the Georgia legislature
that capital punishment may be necessary in some cases is
clearly wrong. Considerations of federalism, as well as respect for
the ability of a legislature to evaluate, in terms of its particular
state, the moral consensus concerning the death penalty and its
social utility as a sanction, require us to conclude, in the absence
of more convincing evidence, that the infliction of death as a
punishment for murder is not without justification and thus is
not unconstitutionally severe. 7
This language may mean not only that the defendant in Gregg failed
to meet the burden of persuasion but that until additional and
convincing evidence of capital punishment's utility becomes avail-
able, the party bearing the burden of persuasion under this line of
inquiry will be handicapped.
14. [Iun assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected legisla-
ture against the constitutional measure, we presume its validity. We may not
require the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so long as the
penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime in-
volved. And a heavy burden rests on those who would attack the judgment of the
representatives of the people.
Id. at 175. In this passage the Court described the deferential standard of review it utilized
in this case. During the Court's examination of the penological justification for capital pun-
ishment the inquiry was stringently restrained to mere rationality, thus, the Court required
no more than an argument that capital punishment may be more effective at serving some
penal purpose than is life sentencing.
15. Id. at 186-87.
16. Id. at 184 n.31 and accompanying text (citing Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment: Ehrlich and His Critics, 85 YALE L. J. 359 (1976); Baldus & Cole, A Comparison
of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment, 85 YALE L. J. 170 (1975); Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac
Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L. J. 187 (1975); Ehrlich, The Deterrent
Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. EcoN. REv. 397 (1975);
T. Sellin, The Death Penalty, A Report for the Model Penal Code Project of the American
Law Institute (1959)). The Court also noted incapacitation had elsewhere been listed among
valid penological purposes but did not indicate whether that objective was a constitutional
justification for capital punishment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 n.28 (1976).
17. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186-87 (1976).
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The third prong of the proportionality test, the potential for
arbitrary imposition of capital punishment under Georgia law, was
also examined in Gregg.'" While testing Georgia's procedural safe-
guards, the plurality dealt peripherally with the question of whether
the crime defined in the capital sentencing statute was severe
enough to justify capital punishment. 9 Although the plurality noted
that the Supreme Court of Georgia narrowly construed the capital
sentencing statute,' the opinion did not expressly approve or disap-
prove of any particular aggravating factors.2 Read most narrowly,
Gregg holds that a death sentence is constitutional under the eighth
amendment when imposed on one who has murdered for pecuniary
gain. Read more broadly, Gregg means the Court cannot interfere
with a state's substantive choice of capital punishment if adequate
procedural safeguards prevent the arbitrary imposition of death
sentences and society approves of such sentences.
The plurality opinion is problematical regarding several aspects
of the emerging test of proportionality which determines whether
the punishment is constitutional within the confines of the eighth
amendment. First, it is unclear whether the three levels of inquiry
in Gregg, which brought the Court to the conclusion that the pun-
ishment was proportionate to the crime, are mutually indepen-
dent.22 For example, could capital punishment be no more severe
than a crime if society disapproves of the sanction or if new empiri-
cal data reveal that capital punishment serves no penological
purposes? Second, Gregg did not state whether the Court will review
a state's choice of aggravating factors or merely inquire into the
state's mechanism for review of procedural safeguards. 3 If the Court
would look beyond state review provisions even though adequate
procedural safeguards existed, how would the Court measure the
severity of a statutorily defined crime? What characteristics of a
crime would be considered when measuring its severity: the particu-
lar offense, the offender, or the amount of social harm necessarily
involved in the crime's statutory definition?
Although Coker provides answers for some of these questions,
the test used by the Court raises new questions about the eighth
amendment. In Coker the plurality more clearly defines the rela-
tionship between the three lines of inquiry set forth in Gregg. The
18. Id. at 196-207.
19. Id. at 197.
20. Id. at 202-03.
21. See also Stotzky, Capital Punishment, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 841, 866 n.109 (1977).
22. See 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 261, 287 (1976).
23. See Stotzky, supra note 21, at 866-67.
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objective indicia of societal approval or disapproval of capital pun-
ishment merely serves to classify capital sentencing legislation as
suspect or non-suspect when imposed for a particular crime.' 4 Even
if the objective factors weigh overwhelmingly against capital pun-
ishment, the state's choice will stand if the legislation passes other
tests of "excessiveness." 25 Thus, the Court's moralistic evaluation of
excessiveness, rather than society's approval, is dispositive of the
constitutional question."
The Court outlines its eighth amendment test for excessive
punishment as follows:
Under Gregg, a punishment is "excessive" and unconstitutional
if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of
punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime. A punishment might fail
the test on either ground. 7
Thus, the Court subtly changed the Gregg test. Previously, it
seemed that under Gregg a punishment would be characterized as
excessive only if it either involved a wanton infliction of pain, as
would some form of torture, or was grossly out of proportion to a
crime. In Coker the Court increases the ban on torture to a ban
on all punishments which fail to make measurable contributions to
penal purposes. It is therefore possible to conclude that Justice
Brennan's and Marshall's "least drastic punishment" 8 analysis ul-
timately prevails over more deferential standards. Such a conclu-
sion, however, must be tentative because the Court did not rely on
this ground for finding excessiveness in Coker.
24. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977). While rejecting Justice Marshall's use of
societal disapproval as a per se eighth amendment test of capital punishment, the Court
seems to parallel California cases which use the same data for a different purpose. The
Supreme Court of California compares California sanctions with those imposed for an identi-
cal crime in other jurisdictions in. order to classify suspect punishment. See In re Rodriguez,
14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975); People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 534
P.2d 1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1975); In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr.
649 (1974); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972). Under this
authority, a jurisdiction's use of a penalty more severe than another jurisdiction's use merely
makes the legislation somewhat suspect. Only the proportionality test is dispositive of a
punishment's constitutionality. People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 178-80, 534 P.2d 1001, 1009-
10, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104-06 (1975). California thus provides standards which check legisla-
tive overzealousness but leave sufficient room for local preferences.
25. 433 U.S. at 584. Accord, People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 178-80, 534 P.2d 1001, 1009-
10, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104-06 (1975).
26. Under a broad reading of Gregg the procedural requirements are met by conforming
with Georgia's capital sentencing procedures. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196-206 (1976).
27. 97 S. Ct. at 2865.
28. See note 5 supra.
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In Coker the Court relies on the second test of excessiveness to
invalidate Georgia's rape statute. The Court concludes that capital
punishment is unconstitutionally severe and disproportionate to the
,crime of rape of an adult. 9 Because the plurality in Gregg glossed
over the question of severity,30 the Court creates a test in Coker. To
determine the severity of a crime for eighth amendment purposes,
three factors are important: the moral depravity of the crime; the
injury to the victim; and the injury to society necessarily incident
to the crime."
In analyzing whether punishment is out of proportion to the
severity of a crime, the Court measures rape against murder, utiliz-
ing capital sentencing statutes for murder as approved standards of
proportionality.32 This reliance on the relationship between murder
and capital punishment does not indicate that the Court has ac-
cepted some simplistic notion of lex talionis.3 To the contrary, the
Court's choice of a reference point indicates its attempt to issue
principled and consistent decisions34 in the relatively uncharted
29. Id. at 2866. The Court finds it unnecessary to consider whether capital punishment
measurably contributes to penological purposes because the sentence is clearly dispropor-
tionate to the crime. However, the Court does observe, "it would be difficult to support a
claim that the death penalty for rape is an indispensable part of the States' criminal justice
system." Id. at n.4. For an illustration of the difficulty which is encountered when trying to
reconcile the deferential standard of Gregg with the Coker test of excessiveness which asks
whether a punishment "makes no measureable contribution to acceptable goals of punish-
ment," see Carmona v. Ward, No. 77-2110 at 2668-69 (2d Cir. April 21, 1978).
30. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
31. But see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (Where defendant was sent-
enced to imprisonment at hard labor for falsifying government records for a miniscule sum
and was subjected to continuing surveillance after discharge from prison held: The punish-
ment was cruel and unusual because the statute defined a crime that could be consummated
by accident and that had actually caused only trivial harm). In Weems, the techniques
employed by the Court included examination of the harm necessarily and actually incident
to violation of the statute, comparison of the punishment for the instant crime with punish-
ment for more severe crimes in the same jurisdiction, and comparison of the instant penalty
with the penalties of all other American jurisdictions for similar crimes.
32. 433 U.S. at 593-600.
33. Petitioner argued that an explanation of juries' reluctance to impose capital sent-
ences for rape indicates an intuitive unwillingness to punish by taking an offender's life for a
crime not involving the loss of life. Brief for Petitioner at 47, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977) (citing Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 844 (1969); Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77
HARv. L. REv. 1071, 1078 (1964)). The plurality includes some language in its opinion which
sweeps close to the approach suggested by the petitioner: "It is difficult to accept the notion,
and we do not, that the rape, with or without aggravating circumstances, should be punished
more heavily than the deliberate killer as long as the rapist does not himself take the life of
his victim." 97 S. Ct. at 2870. This statement, however, is related to separate analytical
considerations. See note 34 infra.
34. By comparing the punishment for a less severe crime (rape of an adult), with the
punishment for a more severe crime (murder), the Court is using a technique designed to
determine whether statutorily classified punishment is suspect. See, e.g., In re Lynch, S Cal.
1978]
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area of constitutional doctrine occupied by the eighth amendment.35
The Court uses an objective method to find the quantum of
moral depravity involved in the rape of an adult. Under this method
the Court seeks to determine the quantum of depravity involved, by
definition, in a violation of the underlying criminal statute. It may
be assumed that no unaggravated crime will involve the degree of
moral depravity necessary to justify the imposition of capital pun-
ishment. The Court then adds to that determination the quantum
of moral depravity necessarily involved in the aggravating circum-
stance(s) found by a jury. If the total depravity required by the
capital sentencing statutes and the statute defining the substantive
3d 410, 426-27, 503 P.2d 921, 931-32, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 227-28 (1972). See also 434 U.S. at
620 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
35. Because federal eighth amendment decisions are sparse, cases such as Coker will
have profound consequences for sentencing legislation not necessarily involving capital pun-
ishment. See, e.g., Carmona v. Ward, 436 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In Carmona, the
constitutionality of a statute providing for life sentencing of possessors of certain quantities
of cocaine was challenged under the eighth amendment. The court stated the rule controlling
the case and the holding as follows:
The Court's recent decision in Coker reaffirmed its previous holding in Gregg that
"a punishment is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out
of proportion to the severity of the crime. A punishment might fail the test on
either ground." In the instant case this court holds that the punishments inflicted
upon petitioners Carmona and Fowler are unconstitutional on the latter ground.
Id. at 1164 (citation omitted).
The court proceeded to apply the techniques used by the United States Supreme Court
in capital punishment cases. The district court compared the cocaine sentencing legislation
with sentencing legislation of the same jurisdiction for more severe crimes, such as arson. The
penalties imposed by other jurisdictions for identical crimes were also compared to the New
York statute. The disparity revealed by these comparisons led the Southern District to find
the statute suspect. The court then determined the statute did not "make some rational
gradations of culpability" to insure proportionality. Id. at 1169. Therefore, life sentencing for
possession of certain amounts of cocaine was invalidated as violative of the eighth amend-
ment. Id. at 1172.
The Second Circuit agreed with the Southern District that eighth amendment principles
apply to non-capital cases. The Second Circuit, however, reversed the Southern District on
the basis that extraordinarily disproportionaate punishments are necessary to offend the
eighth amendment when solely the length of sentence of imprisonment is challenged. The
court noted that it was making new law:
While we have no Supreme Court case directly in point, we accept the proposition
that in some extraordinary instance a severe sentence imposed for a minor offense
could, solely because of its length, be a cruel and unusual punishment. This is
not the case at hand.
Carmona v. Ward, No. 77-2110 at 2655 (2d Cir. April 21, 1978). See also Rummel v. Estelle,
568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978).
Whether a prisoner may offensively use an eighth amendment claim in an action pur-
suant to section 1983 of title 48 of the United States Code is an open queston. Cf. Wycoff v.
Brewer, No. 77-1586 (8th Cir. March 23, 1978) (although extended confinement in strip cells
for post-incarceration misbehavior may have violated the eighth amendment, officials are not
liable in damages for policy formulation and implementation of administrative segregation).
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crime is not significantly more severe than that always involved in
the underlying crime, the death penalty is unconstitutionally severe
and disproportionate to the crime."8
This methodology is applied in Coker in the following manner.
The moral depravity necessarily involved in the underlying crime
was the depravity incident to rape. 7 The quantum of depravity
inherent in the aggravating circumstances found by the jury is then
added to find the total quantum of moral depravity involved. Thus,
the quantum of moral depravity necessarily involved in Coker is
that depravity incident to any rape by a prior capital felony offender
while the offender was committing another capital felony.38
The plurality concludes that the moral depravity necessarily
involved in crimes defined by the Georgia rape and sentencing stat-
utes are not sufficiently heinous to justify the imposition of capital
punishment. The plurality reasoned that capital rape as defined by
the Georgia statutes is not necessarily more heinous than any other
rape. That the defendant previously demonstrated moral deprav-
ity or was demonstrating moral depravity in a collateral act does not
make the rape more heinous than otherwise. 0 The Court concludes
that a separate term of years constitutes adequate punishment for
any collateral act without transforming an otherwise noncapital
crime into a capital offense.4
Read most narrowly, the Court's conclusion demonstrates intol-
erance to imprecisely drafted capital sentencing statutes which fail
to differentiate between varying degrees of heinousness." An eighth
amendment vagueness doctrine may have been generated in this
decision. Coker, read in conjunction with Roberts v. Louisiana,43
36. 433 U.S. at 598-600.
37. See Georgia's statutory definition of rape, note 1 supra.
38. See note 2 supra.
39. 433 U.S. at 599.
40. The Court seems to draw a bright line between capital sentencing and sentencing
for terms of years. While it may be appropriate to impose somewhat greater sentences on
previous offenders, jumping from a prison term to execution is not a difference of degree, it
is a difference in kind. Id. Coker is not authority for the proposition that harsher sentences
may never be dispensed solely on the basis of prior convictions. Coker does not purport to
establish a new rule governing circumstances where multiple bases for imposing imprison-
ment are presented by a single offense. The rule of Coker only applies to capital sentencing
legislation.
41. The Court indicates that multiple sentences would be preferable to capital sentences
where more than one crime was involved. Id. The expedience of aggregating terms of impris-
onment at one sentencing hearing is an inappropriate consideration where capital sentencing
is involved. The Court prefers to separately punish criminal acts to avoid the imposition of a
death sentence where rape is the more serious crime. However, the Court uses dubious
methods to separate the underlying crime from the collateral criminal acts.
42. But see the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Powell. Id. at 601.
43. 431 U.S. 633 (1977). In Roberts, the Louisiana mandatory death sentence provision
19781
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which was decided the same term, indicates the Court will place
substantive limits on capital sentencing by requiring legislatures to
include certain elements in their statutes. As the Court in Roberts
refused to allow the legislature to balance aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors in advance by mandating sentencing requirements, the
Court also refuses Georgia the arbitrary choice of factors comprising
the balance. Under this view of Coker, a capital rape statute which
successfully isolates the more heinous circumstances might be con-
stitutional; however, the broad language of Coker leaves the impres-
sion that no imaginable aggravating factors could make the rape of
an adult as heinous a crime as aggravated murder." Under this view
of Coker, Gregg probably sets a minimum level of constitutionality:
capital punishment is only marginally acceptable for aggravated
murder and entirely unacceptable for "lesser" crimes.
The main point of contention between the plurality opinion and
the views expressed in the concurring and dissenting opinion of
Justice Powell is the plurality's choice of a statute-by-statute rather
than a case-by-case method of review.45 Justice Powell emphasizes
that an extreme variation in the culpability of rapists warrants con-
sideration of the moral depravity actually involved in each case."
Accordingly, his examination focuses on the relationship of capital
punishment to the instant crime and defendant.
for the murder of a policeman in the course of his duties was held unconstitutionally cruel
and unusual. The majority apparently rejected the state's argument that it had balanced the
aggravating factor against all possible mitigating factors and concluded that murdering so-
ciety's footsoldier is so heinous that death is the only appropriate response. Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting, thus stated that argument:
If the State would be constitutionally entitled, due to the nature of the offense,
to sentence the murderer to death after going through such a limited version of
the plurality's "balancing" approach, I see no constitutional reason why the
'Cruel and Unusual Punishment' Clause precludes the State from doing so with-
out engaging in that process.
431 U.S. at 646. The majority, however, did not allow the state to make that moral judgment,
but required the state to allow juries, acting as representatives of community conscience, to
decide whether capital punishment was appropriate in that instance.
44. "It is difficult to accept the notion, and we do not, that the rape, with or without
aggravating circumstances, should be punished more heavily than the deliberate killer as long
as the rapist does not himself take the life of his victim." 431 U.S. at 600.
45. The plurality might respond to Justice Powell that Furman established higher stan-
dards for capital sentencing statutes than for other statutes. Since the history of these stat-
utes is replete with examples of juries' arbitrary application of the death penalty (Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring); Brief for Petitioner at apps. A &
B, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)) legislatures must draft extremely narrow statutes.
The reversal of improper sentencing decisions does not diminish the "moral suffering more
terrible than death" which is inflicted upon those who languish on death row. See Stotzky,
supra note 21, at 853 n.46 (citing A. CAMUS, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RsISTANCE,
REBELLION AND DEATH 131, 151-52 (1960)). Each statute must be perfectly drafted so that no
defendant needlessly experiences such suffering.
46. 433 U.S. at 601.
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For Justice Powell, the Court's imposition on a state's substan-
tive choices should be no more burdensome than requiring legisla-
tures to define aggravating circumstances which compel juries to
determine the degree of heinousness involved in a rape. 7 Legisla-
tures need not precisely codify the universe of factual situations
which justify the imposition of capital punishment. Not only will
such a requirement present insurmountable difficulty, but it will
evidence distrust in the jury as fact-finder." For example, Justice
Powell suggests that a statute which requires jurors to isolate
"deliberate viciousness of the rapist . . . greater than that of [a]
murderer,"'" will withstand eighth amendment attack. The moral
depravity found by that process would also be sufficiently severe to
justify capital punishment under Gregg."
The question arises whether Justice Powell is using a different
test or whether he merely observes a different normative judgment
than the plurality. The crucial distinction between his opinion and
the plurality's is Justice Powell's assumption that rape can be as
heinous as murder and can conceivably involve such horror that the
state is justified in imposing its most horrifying sanction. The plu-
rality expressly denies that premise."
The distinction between the plurality's and Justice Powell's
method becomes clear when comparing the treatment of the second
component of the severity test: injury to the victim. The plurality's
discussion of an adult victim's injury necessarily incident to rape is
limited to the following: "Life is over for the victim of the murder-
ers; for the rape victim life may not be nearly so happy as it was,
47. Id. at 602 n.1. Justice Powell prefers to review capital sentencing statutes in a man-
ner that narrows the statute if an unconstitutional application has been found. This method
of review ameliorates the flaws present in a sentencing statute, while allowing states the
greatest leeway to make substantive choices. Under this approach, pereptrators of heinous
crimes might, in subsequent cases, be sentenced under statutes unconstitutionally applied
to less severe criminal acts in prior cases. Compare Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 793 (4th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972) with Snider v. Peyton, 356 F.2d 626 (4th Cir.
1966). By construing capital sentencing statutes in this manner, a plurality of the Court
disposed of a challenge to Georgia's capital sentencing statute in Gregg. Thus the aggravating
circumstance of heinous, wanton or cruel behavior was held sufficiently precise to withstand
"void for vagueness" arguments: the statute required juries to impose the penalty only under
appropriate circumstances. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 202-03 (1976) (construing GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1973)). Florida's statutory aggravating factor most closely re-
sembling the instant factor has also been interpreted narrowly in order to pass the Court's
scrutiny. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(h) (Supp. 1976) upheld in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,
255-60 (1976).
48. 433 U.S. at 602 n.I.
49. Id. at 603.
50. See note 18 supra.
51. See note 44 supra.
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but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair."5 If the plural-
ity's test is satisfied by this somewhat impressionistic generalization
of the "normal" aftermath of rape, the test is open to the charge that
its value is no greater than the subjective predelictions of the jus-
tices.53 By using such methods, consideration of the victim's injury
has no utility in determining the constitutionality of capital sen-
tencing statutes.
In contrast, Justice Powell's test is flexible enough to differen-
tiate between degrees of victims' injuries. "Some victims are so
grievously injured physically or psychologically that life is beyond
repair."54 Although there is no evidence of extreme physical or psy-
chological damage in the instant case, such evidence might appear
in future cases. But until a record appears containing such facts, the
Court should not prejudice the issue.
Both the plurality's and Justice Powell's analysis of the third
part of the severity test, the public injury incident to the crime, is
truncated. The plurality merely observes that the public is injured
because the community's sense of security is undermined.5 The
plurality's observation is a tautology: it observes that social harm
is socially harmful. Perhaps the more important question, concern-
ing the degree of social harm, is not addressed because public injury
resulting from the rape of an adult is the most difficult of the three
items to quantify. Because of this omission, Coker might be distin-
guished in cases involving crimes with a great deal of social harm,
such as treason.
52. 433 U.S. at 598.
53. The medical evidence of extensive postrape traumatization indicates that the plural-
ity's observation is both impressionistic and an overly broad generalization. See, e.g., Shai-
ness, Psychological Significance of Rape, 76 N.Y.S.J. MED. 2044 (1976); Peters, Social, Legal
and Psychological Effects of Rape on the Victim, 78 PA. MED. 34, 36 (Feb. 1975).
54. 433 U.S. at 603 (emphasis in original).
65. Id. at 598.
56. See 433 U.S. at 621. The crime of treason remains punishable by death. 18 U.S.C. §
2381 (1970).
This portion of the Coker test of severity was central to the majority opinion in Carmona
v. Ward, No. 77-2110 (2d Cir. April 21, 1978). The Second Circuit viewed the New York
legislature's assessment of the dangerousness of the crime of selling and possessing cocaine
as the crucial issue bearing on the constitutionality of the statute. The court greatly expanded
the concept of social harm incident to a crime:
In assessing the gravity of a criminal offense, the primary consideration is the
harm it causes society. The legislature in making the assessment, could probably
view criminal narcotics sales not as a series of isolated transactions, but as symp-
toms of the widespread and pernicious phenomenon of drug distribution. Social
harm in drug distribution is great indeed. The drug seller, at every level of distri-
bution, is at the root of the pervasive cycle of destructive drug abuse.
Id. at 2659-60 (quoting People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 112, 332 N.E.2d 338, 342, 371 N.Y.
S.2d 471, 476-77 (1975)).
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The plurality opinion in Coker illustrates the problems with
current eighth amendment standards of judicial review. First, the
primacy of the Court's principled judgment is undermined by the
manner in which the Court discusses the penological purpose of
punishment. Although not made the grounds of decision, in Coker
the penological purposes test is declared to be an independent basis
for holding capital sentencing legislation unconstitutional. If the
test can be used to hold capital sentencing legislation unconstitu-
tional even though the Court finds the punishment proportionate to
the crime, the Court's moralistic evaluation of the crime and the
punishment is not truly dispositive of eighth amendment claims.
Since the Court's scrutiny of the state's penological justification for
the use of capital punishment will vary inversely with objective
indicia of societal acceptance of capital punishment, quantitative
analysis may replace qualitative analysis in cases following Coker.
Since insurmountable difficulties prevent the objective measure-
ment of punishment's effects," this quantitative analysis may be
concerned solely with the percentage of jurisdictions which author-
ize capital punishment. Thus, it will no longer be the judgment of
the Court that is important, but rather the judgment of many other
groups who may be unaware of the ramifications which their deci-
sions will have on the substantive choice of sanctions by foreign
states. Rather than use the data from different legislatures to clas-
sify sentencing statutes as suspect or non-suspect," courts attempt-
ing to apply this prong of the Coker test will perhaps be led to
truncate other analysis of the excessiveness of the punishment to the
crime.
The penological purposes test is also suspect because it is an
exotic gloss on an uncertainly worded amendment. By relying on
that gloss, the Court may have either enacted Mr. Herbert Packer's
theories of punishment as a constitutional norm or buttressed its
The Second Circuit opinion is troublesome because it insulates from constitutional chal-
lenge any sentencing statute involving a crime generally committed through the auspices of
organized crime. Thus criminal penalties for minor gambling offenses or prostitution may not
be subject to attack even though a life term was clearly disproportionate to a particular
offense.
By using the severity factor as an automatic device for deferring to a legislative choice,
the court has reversed the analytical process described in Coker. Courts must first examine
the degree of social harm involved in a particular crime and then come to a conclusion
concerning the degree of severity involved in a crime. Only after the court has arrived at its
moral evaluation of a crime should it determine whether the legislature's choice is within the
range of acceptability.
57. See note 16 & accompanying text supra.
58. See notes 24-26 & accompanying text supra.
59. It is ironic that Mr. Packer is an eminent critic of judicial intervention based on the
social or philosophical writings of other scholars. See Packer, supra note 33, at 1079-80.
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results against charges of judicial overreaching 0 by appeal to an
accepted theory of the limits of the criminal sanction."' If the plural-
ity has done either by including the dictum concerning measurable
contributions to valid penological purposes, it has muddied a test
that might otherwise have a textual basis in the Constitution."
A second problem with the Coker plurality's eighth amendment
standard is the Court's failure to coherently explain its moralistic
evaluation of the crime and its punishment. The Court's assessment
of the injury to the adult rape victim does not reflect the presump-
tion that the legislature was not arbitrary in its substantive defini-
tion of capital crimes. Even if the choice of capital punishment is
suspect under other parts of the analysis, the state's perception of
the harm attending a crime is entitled to thoughtful examination.
The Court should posit more than a questionable generalization
when rejecting the state's perception of its citizens' injuries and its
affirmative obligations to minimize those injuries.
Courts presented with eighth amendment challenges should not
be convinced that a sentencing statute is unconstitutional merely
because most jurisdictions impose less severe penalties on perpetra-
tors of similar crimes. Rather, they should analyze the degree of
harm caused by a crime in relation to the punishment imposed. If
the moral depravity incident to the crime when added to the injury
to the victim and the injury to the public is in proportion to the
penalty imposed, then the statute is constitutional. Although such
analysis of crime and punishment should be grounded in available
objective data, courts must season such judgments with moral con-
siderations. In this way the "cruel and unusual punishments"
clause will be subject to explicit and principled interpretation.
I. THE AGGRAVATED RAPE OF A MINOR
Florida's Sexual Battery statute" may define a crime suffi-
ciently more heinous than ordinary rape such that capital punish-
ment may constitutionally be imposed upon offenders. A subsection
of that statute reads in pertinent part:
60. These charges have been consistently made by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist in both Furman and Coker.
61. See, e.g., Stotzky, supra note 21, at 850 n.37 (citing as "an excellent analysis of the
theories and justification for criminal punishment" H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION (1968)).
62. See Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment II: The Eighth Amendment
After Furman v. Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REv. 62, 71-79 (1973). The coherence of the test has
been critized as well. See Tao, Beyond Furman v. Georgia: The Need for a Morally Based
Decision on Capital Punishment, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 722 (1976).
63. FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (1975).
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(2) A person 18 years of age or older who commits sexual battery
upon, or injures the sexual organs of, a person of 11 years of age
or younger in an attempt to commit sexual battery upon said
person commits a capital felony as provided in §§ 775.082 and
921.141.11
Thus, in most cases,"5 the quantum of depravity and injury neces-
sarily incident to violations of this subsection is that quantum nec-
essarily incident to the rape of a minor under aggravated circum-
stances. Since the issues raised by an eighth amendment challenge
64. Sexual battery is defined by section 794.011(1)(f) as follows:" 'Sexual battery' means
oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal
or vaginal penetration of another by any other object; however, sexual battery shall not
include acts done for bona fide medical purposes." The capital sentencing statute to which
section 794.011 refers contains the following aggravating and mitigating factors:
(5) AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES-Aggravating circumstances shall
be limited to the following:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of impris-
onment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of
a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or
was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempt to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnap-
ping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a
destructive device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or pre-
venting a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exer-
cise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(6) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES-Mitigating circumstances shall be the
following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented
to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by
another person and his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his con-
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially
impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)-(6)(g) (1975).
65. A literal application of the Florida sexual battery statute would encompass a case
involving the offender's manual penetration of the victim's sex organ or anus. Such a crime
would involve less heinousness than that present in Coker. Thus, Florida must either narrowly
construe the statute or find it unconstitutionally severe.
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to the imposition of capital punishment for this crime are expressly
reserved in Coker," it is conceivable that the statute would be con-
stitutional under the test of Coker.
6 7
The 9upreme Court of Florida has reviewed cases in which two
of the eight enumerated aggravating factors were present and
opined that those factors could define a sexual battery constitution-
ally punishable by death." Those aggravating factors are the know-
ing creation of a great risk of death to many persons 9 and the com-
mission of an especiall heinous, atrocious, or cruel sexual battery.
7
1
One could commit a sexual battery while knowingly creating a
great risk of harm to many persons by coercing one's children to
submit to sexual battery by beating them. 71 In Huckaby v. State
72
the defendant forced his daughters to submit to sexual intercourse
on many occasions during a fourteen year period. At the beginning
of this period the youngest victim was six years of age. The supreme
court agreed with the trial court's finding that by beating his wife
and nine children in order to violate his three daughters, defendant
had caused a great risk of death to many persons.73
Thus, where the trial court might have punished the defendant
with terms of years in addition to life terms for the sexual batteries,
the court imposed a death sentence. Separately punishable behav-
ior, independent of the underlying crime, transformed a noncapital
crime into a capital offense. The United States Supreme Court's
disapproval of such treatment of collateral criminal acts in Coker
may require Florida to eliminate this factor from its capital sentenc-
ing statute for sexual battery.
An alternative basis for imposing capital punishment for sexual
battery, tacitly approved by the court in Huckaby, was the commis-
sion of an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel crime .7 Huckaby
66. 433 U.S. at 592.
67. It is difficult to predict how the Court will decide-such reserved questions. Compare
1976 DEW. C.L. Rxv. 645, 661 with 433 U.S. at 592.
68. Huckaby v. State, 343 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1977) (vacating the death sentence on the
statutory grounds that the mitigating circumstance of mental disorder outweighed the aggra-
vating circumstances). The death penalty has also been imposed by a trial court when a
sexual battery was committed during an attempt to commit rape. Burch v. State, 343 So. 2d
831 (Fla. 1977) (reversing the capital sentence imposed by the judge when jury's life sentence
recommendation had a basis in the evidence). If section 921.141(5)(d) is applied in cases such
as Burch, the statute takes on the resemblance of an unconstitutional mandatory capital
sentencing statute.
69. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(c) (1975).
70. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(h) (1975).
71. Huckaby v. State, 343 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1977).
72. Id.




does not outline the circumstances where this factor might arise,
since only the court's conclusions and not the underlying facts are
reported. Physical beatings to compel sexual submission may be an
instance where the crime is so cruel that, a court could find the
presence of aggravating heinousness.
The mere presence of tissue damage, necessarily incident to the
sexual penetration of a child victim, will not support the finding of
heinousness as an aggravating factor.75 In Purdy v. State," the evi-
dence supporting a finding of heinousness consisted of medical testi-
mony. The seven-year-old victim had experienced pain and discom-
fort occasioned by laceration and infection of her vaginal and anal
tissues. This discomfort had been caused by sexual batteries com-
mitted by the defendant. The supreme court, while admitting the
heinous nature of the crime, found an absence of the aggravating
factor because the physical injury was that which is necessarily
involved in any sexual battery of a child less than twelve years old.77
A contrary holding, the court opined, would change the discretion-
ary capital sentencing statute into a mandatory one.7"
Therefore, under Huckaby and Purdy, the introduction of suffi-
cient evidence of physical, or perhaps even psychological' injury
could result in a finding of heinousness or cruelty. The consequence
of that finding would be the court's recommendation of a death
sentence if no mitigating factors were present.8 0 Coker, however,
may prevent such an occurence because "it would seem that the
defendant could very likely be convicted and tried, and appropri-
ately punished for this additional [heinous] conduct."'"
Other aggravating factors potentially applicable to sexual bat-
tery under the Florida statute are the status of the offender as a
person under sentence of imprisonment, the status of the offender
as a prior capital felony offender, the commission of the crime dur-
ing the commission of other capital crimes, and the commission of
sexual battery for pecuniary gain.82 Under Coker the status of the
offender is not significant enough to transform a noncapital crime
into a capital offense.8 3 Escape or violation of probation or parole
75. Purdy v. State, 343 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1977).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 6.
78. Id.
79. Rape victims under the age of 12 will complain less of physical discomfort but will
manifest symptoms of deeper psychological disturbance than adult rape victims. Peters,
supra note 53, at 36.
80. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1975).
81. 433 U.S. at 599 n.16.
82. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5), supra note 64.
83. 433 U.S. at 598-600.
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can be adequately punished by imprisonment. The prior wrongs of
a defendant do not make a particular act more heinous than other-
wise. Similarly, collateral crimes may be adequately punished by
incarceration if they do not involve the taking of a life.
Thus, the question of whether the aggravating factors for sexual
battery are constitutionally significant turns on the standards of
review used by the Court. The Court's moralistic evaluation of capi-
tal punishment for rape of a minor controls the Court's choice of
standards of review. If the Court perceives the rape of a minor as
being closer in severity to murder than is the rape of an adult, it
should apply the deferential standard of Gregg. If the moral deprav-
ity necessarily incident to sexual battery, when combined with the
social and individual injury, is not significantly greater than that
incident to the crime involved in Coker, strict scrutiny must be
applied.
There are no guidelines other than the principled judgment of
the Court to determine the constitutionality of capital punishment
imposed for the aggravated sexual battery of a minor. The language
of .the eighth amendment places a duty on the Court to make a
moral judgment. Nevertheless, because the Court constitutes a pol-
itical body and coordinate branch of government, the methods it
adopts may have broader ramifications for the structure of Ameri-
can government. The dilemma thus created has been recently ex-
pressed in this way:
I authored the original opinion in this case imposing the
death penalty and join in this denial of a stay of execution only
to comply with requirements of law.
My experience on this Court for almost nine years has con-
vinced me that capital punishment will do little or nothing to
reduce crime. Only by returning to fundamentals of religion, eth-
ics and morality can we prevent the destruction of society."
SETH PARKER JOSEPH
84. Spenkelink v. State, 350 So. 2d 85, 86 (Fla. 1977) (Boyd, J., concurring specially).
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